Critical realism - my next steps

Since writing my last blog post I passed my 2nd year of study and got my upgrade. But, as I mentioned in the comments and reflections I wrote to my supervisor, the examiners who reviewed my work clearly picked up on the tensions and the struggles that I was trying to navigate between a critical realist stance and an interpretivist stance.

("Truth Values - Ayn Rand - Relativism - Objectivism - free to use" by Templestream is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.)

While Scott (2010) points out that, from a pragmatist stance, such considerations are essentially epistemic and are therefore not related the collection and analysis of data, in much the same manner as Scott (2010), I have to say I disagree.  I can't remember the author, or where I read it (if anyone has a reference for this, please message me or leave a comment) but I remember reading somewhere that ontology could be understood as asking the question of what the world/reality is like, what can be known and captured in research?  And epistemology was concerned with questions, if something can be known, then how can we know?  How can we research it?  With that in mind, ontology and epistemology have to be important considerations in any research endeavour.

In my own study, and in my own experience as a mathematician, I've found it very difficult moving from a positivist paradigm to a relativist one.  So Critical Realism (CR) was therefore attractive to me as an inclusive midpoint between the two positions.  Beyond that however, Pilgrim (2020) wrote:

"First, [Critical Realism] guides us in what is the best way to understand the natural and social worlds we enter, exist in and then depart. Second, it encourages our reflexivity about our presence in the world and our ethical obligations as professionals and human beings."

What's not to love about that!  If I've got a guide that is going to help me to understand the social world and navigate the ethical complexities of researching such a world, then I'm gonna take it.  But I've since discovered that it isn't that simple.  The intricacies of CR philosophy are intimidating.

Never-the-less, my logic was that, if I could understand this "ontologically maximally inclusive" (Bhaskar, 2014) midpoint between the positions of realism and relativism (Moon and Blackman, 2014) then I could determine my own position by making minimal adjustments in either direction depending on whether or not I agreed with the work of CR theorists and academics.  However, it hasn't quite worked out that way.  In fact, it almost feels like something of a project in itself just trying to get my head around this ontology.  While I acknowledge that this is partly a reflection of the nature of my study, the feedback I got from my examiners painted what seemed a very positivist picture.  In suggesting that CR is a theory led paradigm, the examiners feedback made CR sound very similar to statistical hypothesis testing, a technique that I learned in my undergrad maths degree where a researcher has a pre-existing hypothesis that they aim to prove or disprove before the research even begins.  I don't like that and I dont agree with it.  But I kept reading and I keep coming back to my research question:

"How have changes to the infrastructure of Scotland’s Further Education (FE) colleges affected the professionalism of lecturers operating in the Scottish FE sector?”

I quickly realised there was no shortcut.  I had to start at the beginning and look at my assumptions about the social world and ask myself some basic questions, philosophical questions, ethical questions and consider what the answers say about me as a researcher, my world view and my chosen research methods.  But I had one starting premise. I'm choosing to foreground the experience of my research participants here in my work because I don't believe it's right to represent the reality of people and the complexity of their lives as mere numbers despite everything my undergrad training had taught me.  (Interestingly I've since learned this in itself is a critical realist position, to reject a reductionist view of human behaviour and human intentionality).  

("I reject your reality ... pattern" by Cross-stitch ninja is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.)

So I began at the beginning, with infrastructure, and I asked myself the question - is it real?  It seems obvious to say that these things are real in a very physical way.  The roads we drive on, the buildings we live and work in, the technology we use to communicate with other people.  They can be seen, observed, measured, they can be quantified and they can be described in terms of their physical dimensions and their material properties.  So in every way, studying infrastructure lends itself to a very positivist, almost mathematical way of thinking.  Just like experiments in a lab, physical infrastructure can be seen, observed, measured, monitored and modified to get better results.  Infrastructure is physically real.  But what effect does it have in our lives?  Does it make a difference?  According to Mahmoudi (2020) infrastructure should make a difference to the quality of our lives and according to Critical Realism, an entity is real if it has an effect, if it makes a difference to people's  actions and behaviours (Fleetwood, 2004).  With that in mind I am pretty sure that infrastructure can be studied.

But importantly I learned from this that the term realism, and different forms of realism, are often conflated with notions of positivism.  CR practitioners would argue that positivists engage with the social world at the empirical level of reality e.g. via data, numbers, physical, measurable, observable phenomena.  However, positivism and critical realism differ because the latter subscribes to realism at the ontological level (at the level of being) rather than the empirical level (at the level of data).  For example, I've written about my upbringing and religious beliefs before in other articles.  I'm completely aware therefore that some would dismiss my religious beliefs and experience as fairy stories and definitely not real.  However, Critical Realism gives space for people to discussing such experiences because it recognises such experiences as real when they have an effect on people's lives, actions and behaviours.  This is significant for me because it lends credibility to my own experiences.  Moreover, as my own study aims to examine the experiences of others via a narrative approach, ethically I am reasssured that this is right thing to do.  It is not my place to question the reality of other people's stories.  But if my research participants relay stories that highlight experiences of infrastructural change that had an impact on their professionalism, I can acknowledge that those experiences are real and therefore can be studied.

So with that clear in my head, the next question I asked myself was  "Is professionalism ontologically real?"  That question is not so easy to answer.  A few months ago I wrote an article about professionalism and what what effect it had if an employee in any organisation was described as professional?  Does it have an effect?  I came to the conclusion that it does.  So ontologically, according to the CR paradigm, professionalism must be real.  However, the concept of professionalism isn't real in the same physical, observable way that infrastructure is.  It isn't so easily observable.  Indeed in reviewing the literature on professionalism it is clear that this is a contested term.  So I began to understand that different entities can be real in different ways.  Fleetwood (2004) describes this as the modes of reality whereby entities can be materially real, ideally real, artifactually real or socially real.  So while infrastructure can be described as artifactually real, professionalism as a concept would be considered ideally real.  Importantly, both are ontologically real.  So in that respect, they can be studied.  But the next logical question to ask is, how we can go about studying them.  In doing so I can start to turn my thinking to epistemological matters - how can I study them?    

As I conducted my literature review I found that any understanding we have of professionalism is transitive in nature in so far as human understanding of it has varied over time and space.  Demirkasimoğlu (2010) provides a great overview of the topic whereby the author highlights that, by some definitions, teachers may only ever be considered as semi-professionals. Scott (2010) highlights that this transitive dimension to knowledge construction underpins the critical realist tenet relating to the fallibility of knowledge.  For if our knowledge of professionalism is always evolving and can be interpreted in different ways by different people then researching with the intention of uncovering some underlying absolute truth becomes impossible.  These various interpretations may have emerged through the decades and evolved in response to changes in social, political, economic and technological developments.  As such researchers can only ever strive to keep up with emerging thoughts around the subject.

("Doing my best to keep up with Mom ..." by Ed Yourdon is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.)

But, as I read, something troubled me about Scott's (2010) writing.  As I read more I found myself struck by the notion where he presents the task of the researcher as striving to find out some absolute truth about the world and he poses the proposition that methodological choices are made to enable the researcher to get as close to that truth as possible.  I found this interesting because, in addition to his acknowledgement of the fallibility of knowledge, it struck me that such an understanding of any research enterprise skirts a fine line around positivist definitions of objectivity.  Moreover, it presumes that the researcher's aim is to uncover truth.  

I think I found this troubling because it was unhelpful to think of my research in this way and even unethical for, in aiming to uncover the truth of people's experience of infrastructural change, this implies that value judgements must be made with regard to uncovering and discarding untrue accounts offered by my research participants.  It seems counter intuitive to suggest that some account would be of less value than others when we have already determined that such experiences would be considered ontologically real, regardless of their truth value.

Therefore, in this regard I would distance myself from Scott's (2010) work.

In my exploration of narrative methods I've come to understand that any discussion of professionalism and professional identity will always be limited by the fact that narrator of the story) will present a different identity to their audience depending on their purpose, limitations of recall, and any truth value that I ascribe to that story will be mediated by my own understanding, positionality and experiences (Riessman, 2008) since narrative inquiry is, by its very nature, a dialogic process.  But, perhaps more importantly, there is no recognition in Scott's (2010) definition of the research activity which highlights the important role of ethics.  A search for truth is not a licence to raise the curtain and look behind the scenes at someone's life in order to confirm whether the version of events that they've recounted is true or not.  In fact there may be good reasons why any interviewee may not tell the truth e.g. for fear of harm or reprisal, or event to protect the identify of those implicated in their story.  

Theatre audiences pay for a ticket, not to see behind the scenes, but to enjoy the story being played out on stage, and for the privilege of being able to interpret the storyteller's intentions for themselves.  In paying the price of the theatre ticket, there is an implicit recognition of your role as an audience member, a role that distances the audience from the truth of what happens behind the scenes at the theatre.  It is a different experience and a reflection of your positionality within the dialogic process.

("Los Angeles Theatre" by Floyd B. Bariscale is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.)

While ethically it is not my place to question the truth of the stories presented by my research participants, Scott's (2010) writing on critical realism highlights that such a position forces me to acknowledge that my methodological choices will never be a 100% reflection of some external truth.  This is a limitation of my study.  Any story that my research participants share with me is limited by ethical and contextual constraints.  It is perhaps in this respect that Scott's comment that:

"Any investigation can only take place at the intersection or vertex of agential and structural objects..."

...begins to make sense.  My research participants have agency and are capable of sharing details of their experience in a number of ways.  But their position within a range of social structures such as the family, the workplace or the community may influence what they choose to share, how they choose to share and how much they choose to share, if they choose to share at all.  However, I can draw comfort in the fact that Caine et al. (2022) reminds us that, in their view, narrative enquiry provides researchers with the best way of understanding human experience.  

Any version of themselves that my research partipants share by way of narrative their professional stories constitutes what my participants want me to see.  This is entirely consistent with the sociological principles of identity theory.  In this respect Scott (2010, p. 29) provides encouraging words for qualitative researchers by highlighting that intentional dimensions of human life are, "central to complete explanations of social life".  So my understanding of this is that, despite my less than perfect choice of research method, the need for such qualitative work is an important compliment to any studies in professionalism which focus on the quantitative, extensional properties of social actors.

Scott (2010, p. 33) comments that:

"...critical realism is critical and realist for two reasons: objects in the world, and in particular social objects, exist whether the observer or researcher is able to know them or not; and second, knowledge of these objects is always fallible because any attempts at describing them need to take account of the transitive nature of knowledge construction."

I certainly think that personal and professional identities exist, but it can be challenging for the researcher to know them.  I might even go further pointing out that there may be aspects of an individual's identity that they themselves aren't even aware of.  But Scott (2010) also warns against the danger of collapsing an understanding of reality into a process of textual analysis.  Reissman (2008)  points out that narrative researchers have choices to make in the process of data transcription.  But, one particular method of transcription where the narrator and audience engage in storytelling through dialogue Reissman (2008) argues constitutes the autobiographical self.  

I'm genuinely trying hard to understand this paradigm because I think it's important for ontology, epistemology and methodology to be in alignment.  Exploring Scott's book is helping because I'm now more sure than ever that everything is lining up.  It's a short book and I'm only half way through reading it.  It's not an easy read.  But, just like Pilgrim (2022) highlighted, engaging with the paradigm of critical realism is forcing me to think about my ethical stance, my positionality and reflexivity.  

But it's also brought me to realise that there is a problem with my research question. 

("That is the Question" by cogdogblog is licensed under CC BY 2.0.)

My research question focuses on how infrastructural change affects the professionalism of lecturers in the Scottish FE sector.  But, in posing this question, I'm focusing on a single causal mechanism which, in a sense, is reductive as it ignores the possibility that other factors may be involved.  What will I do if my research participants point to other causal mechanisms?  Other causal mechanisms beyond infrastructure that I haven't considered?  Causal mechanisms that may be more significant to my research participants?  I can't just ignore the possibility.  Nor can I dismiss the experience of my research participants.  Indeed, according to Reissman (2008) I should follow the stories that my research participants set out for me.  Perhaps then I should be considering other sub-questions such as:

(a)  Does the infrastructure of Scotland’s FE colleges affected the professionalism of lecturers?

(b)  In what ways does infrastructural change affect the professionalism of lecturers in the Scottish FE sector? 

(c)  What other causal mechanisms can affect lecturer professionalism?

Perhaps question (c) is a matter for another study.  But what still bugs me is that I still don't have any answers with regard to the "theory driven" nature of critical realism.  Is this positivism by the back door?  I suppose I have to keep reading.

Stay tuned for the next thrilling installment of my journey with critical realism.  

References

Bhaskar, R. (2014) ‘Foreword’, in Edwards, P. K., O’Mahoney, J. and Vincent, S. (eds) Studying Organisations Using Critical Realism: A Practical Guide, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Caine, V., Clandinin, D. J. and Lessard, S. (2022) Narrative Inquiry: Philosophical Roots, London, Bloomsbury.  

Demirkasimoğlu, N. (2010) ‘Defining “Teacher Professionalism” from different perspectives”, Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 9, 2047 – 2051, DOI: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.12.444. 

Fleetwood, S. (2004) 'An ontology for organisation and management studies', in Fleetwood, S. and Akroyd, S. (eds) Critical Realist Applications in Organisation and Management Studies, London, Routledge.

Mahmoudi, H. (2023) ‘The Infrastructure of Infrastructure’ in Mahmoudi, H., Roe, J. and Seaman, K. (eds) Infrastructure, Wellbeing and the Measurement of Happiness, New York, Routledge, pp. 1 – 6.

Moon, K. and Blackman, D. (2014) ‘A Guide to Understanding Social Science Research for Natural Scientists’, Conservation Biology, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 1167 – 1177, DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12326.

Pilgrim, D. (2020) Critical Realism for Psychologists [eBook reader], Oxon., Routledge.

Riessman, C. K. (2008) Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences, London, Sage.

Scott, D. (2010)  Education, Epistemology and Critical Realism, Oxon., Routledge.